Reality, Consciousness, and the Physical World
A two-level Bayesian analysis
What is reality ultimately made of—and is the world we observe its fundamental level? Those are different questions, and this paper models them separately.
The argument
One level compares physicalism, idealism, Russellian monism, and dualist theories. The other asks whether the local world is fundamental, simulated, or otherwise dependent. Simulation is treated as compatible with more than one ultimate ontology.
How to read this assessment
The probabilities depend on philosophical partitions, priors, and evidence weights. The success of local physical science does not by itself settle whether that local level is metaphysically fundamental.
A question worth pursuing
Which observations discriminate among ontologies rather than fitting several equally well?
Cite and share
This page provides an editorial introduction. Consult the paper for its complete evidence, assumptions, sources, and collaboration disclosures. Downloads preserve the edition retrieved on October 18, 2026.